Risk Management In Developing Countries: Evidence From Multinational And Country Financial Risk Analysis by Osho, Gbolahan et al.
Journal of Business & Economics Research – August 2005                                                          Volume 3, Number 8 
 1 
Risk Management In Developing Countries: 
Evidence From Multinational And Country 
Financial Risk Analysis 
Gbolahan Osho, (Email: oshos@uhd.edu), University of Houston-Downtown 
Johnston Osagie, (Email: johnston.osagie@famu.edu), Florida A&M University 
Michael O. Adams, (Email: Adams_MO@tsu.edu), Texas Southern University  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Much better access to international financial markets has granted many benefits to developing 
countries, but at the same time this approach has also exposed them to the unpredictable changes of 
these markets.  However, the amount that can be hedged is limited because the other parties are 
usually given a ceiling to the total debt that they can get into with another country.  Unlike 
borrowers, developing countries have limited possibilities of exploiting market niches to develop 
their investor base. The objective of this research paper is to look at different countries such as 
Russia and Mexico, and also realize how economic, political, and social risks account for these 
developing countries foreign and public debts; and how the management of these risks are 
necessary to combat the overall exposures these countries come across. With a fiscal view the 
primary cause of monetary growth in developing economies is usually found in large financial 
imbalances.  The effect of inflation itself on the actual value of these countries financial deficits 
indicates the link between fiscal deficits, money growth, and inflation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
uch better access to international financial markets has granted many benefits to developing countries, 
but at the same time this approach has also exposed them to the unpredictable changes of these 
markets.  The sizable external foreign currency debt of many developing countries makes them 
vulnerable to changes in international exchange rates, interest rates, and currency attacks.  Cautious macroeconomic 
policies have at times been confused by the fiscal consequences of losses associated with these aspects.  As the 
international outgrowth markets have grown with lack of clearness, the chances of hedging the risks that come with 
borrowing in foreign currencies has expanded a great deal.  Borrowers can act on opportunities to exploit market 
holes, and develop their investor base without bringing about the exchange rate risk.  They can also use the interest 
rate swap market to manage the fully developed structure of their external debt.   
 
However, the amount that can be hedged is limited because the other parties are usually given a ceiling to the 
total debt that they can get into with another country.  Unlike borrowers, developing countries have limited 
possibilities of exploiting market niches to develop their investor base. The objective of this research paper is to look 
at different countries such as Russia and Mexico, and also realize how economic, political, and social risks account for 
these developing countries foreign and public debts; and how the management of these risks are necessary to combat 
the overall exposures these countries come across. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Sensible macroeconomic policies at times have been compromised by the consequences of losses associated 
with swings in international exchange rates.  The most recent of such policies is the one set out by Russia.  Russia had 
defaulted on domestic debt, devalued the rubble, and froze the payments of earlier Soviet-era commercial debt.  The 
United States and a few European banks lost some $10 billion to debt default alone, and swore to never go near Russia 
M 
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again.  Yet due to a change in macroeconomic policies, Russia was able to have some of their defaulted debts forgiven 
(Belton 2000).  Now those banks that vowed never to do business with Russia, now praise the command of the 
country’s return to international bond markets, in the form of a huge issue of restructured commercial debt.  These 
financial critics are hoping for an unbelievable economic rebound. The main economic and financial initiative that had 
investors encouraged is that Russia had the best performing fixed income market in the years 1999 and 2000 (J.P. 
Morgan 2000).  Other areas of policy changes involved the devaluation of the rubble at a time when oil prices surged.  
Russia also restructured $32 billion in soviet-era commercial debt (figure 1).  Banks wrote off $10.6 billion and 
Russia issued a $18.2 billion 30-year issue, and a $10.6 billion 10-year issue for the balance (Belton 2000).  Other 
defaulted nations looked on and found themselves in not so fortunate of a position. 
 
 
Figure1: The Distribution of Country Equity Returns 
 
 
 
 
Exposure of developing countries to currency risk can be broadly measured by the amount of external public 
debt they have incurred.  In 1996, the outstanding stock of sovereign debt issued or guaranteed by developing 
countries was $1.5 trillion, or 300 percent of their foreign currency reserves.  About one-half of their external debt 
was open to foreign interest rate risk.  During the past two decades, a great deal of emerging markets in developing 
countries has been hurt by adverse movements in exchange rates and international interest rates.  In the early 1980’s, 
the debt servicing loads of some countries in Africa, southeast Asia, and Latin America, were affected a great deal.  
Coming from the dollars' appreciation, a worldwide increase in interest rates, and a decline in commodity prices 
occurred.  Several Asian countries saw significant increases in their debt burdens in the early 1990’s; this was due to 
their unheeded exposures to Japanese yen.  A third of the increase in the dollar value of Indonesia’s external debt 
between 1993 and 1995 was due to cross currency movements, in particular the steep appreciation of the yen.  At the 
time, 37 percent of Indonesia’s external debt was denominated in yen, while around 90 percent of its export revenues 
were denominated in dollars (Agnor 1995). 
 
A country’s vulnerability to external shocks contributes to their total amount of debt, which is shown in the 
case of Mexico.  Mexico’s public debt was rather low by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (O.E.C.D.1995) standards, 51 percent of GDP, compared with an average of 71 percent for the O.E.C.D. 
countries.  The Mexican crisis shows the difficulty and cost of refinancing a real volume of foreign currency debt that 
was to mature in turbulent foreign exchange markets.  Mexico’s economy was susceptible to a financial crisis because 
their foreign exchange reserves totaled $6.3 billion at the end of 1994, and their short term securities indexed to the 
dollar were worth $29 billion, and due to mature in 1995 (O.E.C.D. 1995).  The O.E.C.D. believes that the risks 
associated with a large net currency exposure, along with the existence of deep and liquid domestic capital markets, 
are the main reasons that the governments of a great deal of the industrial countries have limited their giving out of 
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foreign currency debt.  These governments have established legal clauses that are supported by the lawmakers of their 
countries.   
 
Large advanced economies such as Germany, Japan, and the United States do not issue foreign currency 
debt, while France and the United Kingdom issue a small amount in ECU’s.  Foreign currency debt represents around 
3 percent of total public debt in Canada, and their budget deficit is all funded in domestic currency.  Small advanced 
economies such as, Belgium, Denmark, and New Zealand have stopped issuing foreign currency debt except to 
replenish their foreign currency reserves.  In Ireland, gross foreign currency borrowing is limited to the level of 
maturing foreign currency debt.  Spain and Sweden issue foreign currency debt, but they hedge their currency risk 
through swap options.  However, in developing countries governments need to access international debt markets to 
balance out their shortage of local savings, lengthen the maturity of their debt, diversify their interest rate risk 
exposure, accumulate foreign exchange reserves, or come up with a way for domestic private entities to issue abroad.  
The foreign currency could be switched to domestic currency, or to a currency that is closely related to the domestic 
currency in which liquid optional markets exist.  This would prevent borrowing strategies aimed at reducing interest 
rates, along with softening internal budget constraints (Agnor 1995).  
 
It seems that these countries are at financial risks all the time despite the attractive opportunities that are 
available.  They just cannot seem to meet their financial obligations, but they continue to take lengthy financial risks 
in the form of loans from the World Bank, and the international monetary fund.  It seems that these countries do not 
fully know the risks involved, and they are stuck with hard and discouraging repayment guidelines.  Many 
underdeveloped countries that have borrowed heavily in foreign currencies in the past are now faced with important 
policy changes.  These changes include how to manage their currencies, interest rates, and their maturity risks 
associated with their debts.  In order for these countries to implement policies that will aid them in fulfilling their 
obligations to external creditors, they require management by non-political sections of their communities.  This is not 
always so easy for administrators whose goals are to earn the highest returns from their resources, and please their 
domestic demands (O.E.C.D. 1995).  
 
Management of the risks that come along with external exposures requires technical expertise, sophisticated 
information technology, and controlled internal management procedures that contain steady enforcement of trading 
and exposure limits.  These requirements are hard to follow even in the best of circumstances, therefore making it very 
difficult in developing countries.  Some emerging markets have found it hard to bring in qualified staff, build 
sufficient information and control systems, and develop the administrative controls that are needed to manage overall 
exposures because they often begin without the necessary financial tools to support these initiatives (Dubash 2000).  
Management should be protected from political interference to help to secure transparency and accountability.  The 
debt management of developing countries should be entrusted to portfolio managers who have knowledge and 
experience in risk management techniques, and these managers should be measured according to a set of criteria set 
forth by the ministry of finance.  Lastly, enough resources need to be designated to hiring high quality staff, and 
getting sophisticated support systems (O.E.C.D. 1995). 
 
The extent of a country's outside position on its creditworthiness is measured by the extent of its existing 
obligations.  The scale of a country’s outside payment obligation is determined by the ratio of its external debt to 
GDP.  Credit rating agencies tend to rate high debt countries differently than low debt countries.  The country’s ability 
to make good on their external obligations is assumed to be shown in the growth rate of its exports, it’s current 
account position, the ratio of its non-gold international reserves to imports, and it’s real exchange rate.  In most 
instances, the developing countries have low ratings in almost all of these areas.  Because they are lacking in these 
points, it is important for them to effectively manage the other aspects of the ratings.  These other areas are the 
internal economic, political, and social factors that also control their credit ratings (Table 1).  
 
For countries that have been going through a high rate of inflation, a sharp drop in their inflation rate will 
improve their credit rating a great deal.  More often than not, the strategy of these underdeveloped countries is to 
devise policies to feed, clothe, and house themselves at the cost of the lenders or investors, instead of trying to pursue 
economic policies such as those that Russia was able to implement.  These governments main goal should be to 
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improve their country’s current account balance, along with implementing a program for the revival of growth through 
economic recovery systems (Dubash 2000). 
 
 
Table 1: Market Weights in the International Finance Multinational Corporation IFMC Indices 
  
IFMC 
Global 
Indices     
IFMC 
Investable 
Indices     
  Market Weight  Market Weight 
 No. of Capitalization in IFC No. of Capitalization in IFC 
Market Stocks (US$ Mil) Composite Stocks (US$ Mil) Composite 
Argentina 35 22307.8 2 31 22161.1 3.5 
Brazil 86 93939.6 8.5 68 63813.7 10.2 
Mexico 81 65162.4 5.9 65 58686.5 9.3 
Peru 36 7421.7 0.7 20 6910 1.1 
Venezuela 16 2652.3 0.2 5 1930.8 0.3 
China 171 29494.8 2.7 23 3005.5 0.5 
Korea 151 125037.1 11.2 145 17314.7 2.8 
Philippines 46 39729.2 3.6 35 19314.9 3.1 
India 131 71141.3 6.4 76 14792.2 2.4 
Indonesia 45 54570.7 4.9 44 27724.6 4.4 
Malaysia 123 162134.5 14.6 123 135326 21.5 
Pakistan 68 6646.6 0.6 25 4951 0.8 
Czech Republic 69 12346.3 1.1 5 5206.7 0.8 
Jordan 51 3276.3 0.3 8 1107.4 0.2 
Portugal 30 11404.5 1 26 9012 1.4 
South Africa 63 105981.4 9.5 63 105981.4 16.9 
Regions       
Composite 1682 1112233 100 1116 628429.1 100 
Latin America 329 237564 21.4 247 197855.5 31.5 
Asia 935 699579.5 62.9 631 271211.4 43.2 
EMEA 394 175089.1 15.7 238 159362.2 25.4 
  Sources: Analyst/Contact: Campbell R. Harvey 
 
 
RESULT ANALYSIS  
 
The large foreign currency exposure of emerging markets can be explained by a number of factors; including 
low domestic savings rates, the lack of domestic borrowing instruments, and the high proportion of official financing 
which tends to be denominated in the donor countries currencies.  Governments issue debt in foreign currencies, to 
show that they are committed to a policy of stable exchange rates or prices.  At the same time, policy makers may 
show a commitment to stable prices by issuing inflation-indexed bonds.  These bonds generally serve the interest of 
the country, and sometimes the returns are not promising to the foreign investors, they tend to serve the interest of the 
administration and not the population of the country.   
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Figure 2: International Country Returns Moments vs. Risk Attributes 
 
 
More recently emerging markets have regained access to international debt markets, and the choice of 
currencies and maturity structures, are often driven by the desire to gather the fiscal gains of borrowing in countries 
with low coupon rates.  The leaders of these developing countries often underestimate the risk involved with unstable 
foreign currency borrowing for various reasons.  First, the ability of governments to generate foreign currency 
revenues to repay their obligations is limited, especially if the country lacks natural resources.  Making government 
assets consisting mainly of the discounted value of future taxes in local currency.  
 
Second, it is not likely that the costs in terms of output, welfare, and reputation that a country could come 
across in the event of a opposing external shock, is taken into account in an emerging markets external borrowing 
strategies.  Although the likelihood of crises is small, except in the case of natural disasters, the potential disorder to 
an economy is great, as seen in many unstable third world regimes.  A foreign exchange exposure boosts the economic 
impact of external shocks, and limits the financial policy options available during a financial crisis.  For example, a 
country with a large net foreign currency obligation would have a hard time pursuing an aggressive monetary policy 
in the mist of a financial crisis.  This is because it might cause a sharp decline in the domestic currency, which 
ultimately limits investment abroad, as well as at home.   
 
A depreciation in the currency could worsen the country’s debt and risk profile, and harden the financial 
crisis.  In the event of a real exchange rate shock, a government will be faced with the spike of its external debt 
servicing costs, and a drop in the foreign currency values of its revenues.   
 
Along with potential capital losses, a government may incur on its debt portfolio, being able to enter 
international markets to refinance its growing debt is likely to be hindered.  Taking the previous mentioned issues into 
consideration will be advantageous for the lender and the borrower as long as they understand their obligations, since 
it is possible that both could end up losing in the end (Table 2). 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the short run links between money growth, exchange rate depreciation, nominal wage 
growth, repeated movements in output, and inflation in middle income developing countries such as Russia, Mexico, 
Belgium, and Denmark, to mention a few (Table 3).  With a fiscal view the primary cause of monetary growth in 
developing economies is usually found in large financial imbalances.  In many of these countries, inefficient ways of 
collecting revenues and limited development of financial markets, make these countries rely on borrowing money to 
finance their financial deficits.  The effect of inflation itself on the actual value of these countries financial deficits, 
show to support the link between fiscal deficits, money growth, and inflation.  On the other hand, the balance of 
payment view showed the causes of exchange rate movements on domestic and foreign prices. 
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Table 2: Comparison of International Finance Multinational Corporation IFMC and Morgan Stanley. 
Capital International MSCI Emerging Market Global Indices 
  Mean Volatility Tracking Correlation 
 Start Difference Difference Error 
IFMC vs. MSCI 
IFMC vs. 
Composite 
Country Date IFMC - MSCI  
Argentina Jan-88 -10.60% -21.10% 61.90% 0.76 0.01 -0.06 0.19 0.04 
Brazil Jan-88 1.40% 2.30% 19.40% 0.96 0.22 0.23 0.28 0.34 
Mexico Jan-88 1.40% -1.30% 10.90% 0.96 0.28 0.26 0.45 0.48 
Peru Jan-93 -0.10% 2.60% 7.00% 0.99 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.46 
Venezuela Jan-93 -4.00% -2.00% 9.10% 0.98 -0.03 -0.12 0.19 
-
0.15 
Korea Jan-88 -0.20% 0.30% 6.70% 0.97 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.38 
Philippines Jan-88 2.30% 0.00% 9.70% 0.95 0.37 0.36 0.5 0.47 
India Jan-93 5.00% -1.50% 6.60% 0.98 0.02 -0.13 0.38 0.16 
Indonesia Jan-90 -1.40% 2.20% 9.10% 0.96 0.11 0.15 0.37 0.45 
Jordan Jan-88 -4.20% -0.10% 11.90% 0.75 0.09 0.22 0.16 0.14 
Malaysia Jan-88 0.60% 0.10% 4.80% 0.98 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.48 
Pakistan Jan-93 0.10% 2.50% 4.50% 0.99 0.01 0.02 0.51 0.16 
South Africa Jan-93 -1.40% -0.20% 3.20% 0.99 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.53 
Average  -0.40% -0.80% 11.50% 0.95 0.20 0.19 0.35 0.31 
Source: IFC Global Indices, MSCI EM Indices Monthly returns in US Dollars. 
 
 
Figure 3: Semi Annual Cross-sectional Regressions Country Index Returns 
on lagged Risk Level Institutional Investor CCR 
 
 
 Movements like exchange rate depreciations, are usually the results of harmful developments in the balance 
of payments.  Such developments may reflect on the risk management of the assets and liabilities of these developing 
countries, and their unnecessary government spending, which causes them not to meet their financial obligations 
(Figure 3).     
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ICRGC:  Political Risk Services: International Country Risk Guide - Composite 
ICRGP: Political Risk Services: International Country Risk Guide - Political 
ICRGF: Political Risk Services: International Country Risk Guide - Financial 
ICRGE : Political Risk Services: International Country Risk Guide - Economic 
IICCR: Institutional Investor Country Credit Ratings 
EMCRR: Euromoney Country Risk Ratings 
INFLATE: Annual Consumer Inflation: IFS Database 
TRDGDP: Trade Openness (Exports + Imports)/GDP 
POPGR: Annual Growth in Total Population - UN Data 
AAGEGR: Annual Growth in Average Age of Population - UN Data 
AVEAGE: Average Age of Population - UN Data 
MKTCAP: IFC Global Market Capitalization (Millions of US$) 
P/E: IFC Global Price/Earnings Ratio 
P/B: IFC Global Price/Book Ratio 
P/D: IFC Global Price/Dividend Ratio 
 
 
Table 3: Country Risk Level Portfolio Strategy with Country Attributes 
 
Country IICCR EMCRR INFLATE TRDGDP POPGR AAGEGR AVEAGE MKTCAP P/E P/B P/D 
Argentina 38.4 57.2 0.70% 12.80% 1.20% 0.30% 30.9 22308 16.7 1.4 29.2 
Brazil 35.8 55.4 29.20% 13.60% 1.70% 0.80% 27.1 93940 40.3 0.5 28.9 
Chile 59.2 79.8 7.60% 42.10% 1.60% 0.60% 29 39421 15.9 1.9 26.1 
China 56.4 70.8   1.00% 0.90% 29.6 29495 31.8 2 37.6 
India 45.8 66.7 9.70% 17.20% 1.90% 0.50% 26 71141 14.3 2.3 65.8 
Indonesia 51.8 73.2 10.50% 43.90% 1.50% 0.80% 26.2 54571 26.6 3.5 112.4 
Jordan 30.5 54.3 7.00% 130.10% 4.60% 0.30% 21.4 3276 15.6 1.7 50 
Malaysia 68.4 84.5 3.30% 166.40% 2.30% 0.60% 24.8 162134 28.4 3.7 83.3 
Mexico 41.2 58.8 43.80% 37.20% 2.00% 0.90% 24.8 65162 18.6 1.7 117.6 
Pakistan 29.5 50.7 9.80% 35.40% 2.80% 0.30% 21.9 6647 16.4 2.1 45.7 
Peru 27.2 47.5 11.60% 20.20%    7422 13.8 2.7 90.1 
Philippines 38.1 63.5 12.30% 54.30% 2.10% 0.60% 24 39729 21.2 3.8 153.8 
South Africa 46.3 64.9 6.80% 38.50% 2.20% 0.20% 25 105981 19.2 2.7 49 
South  72 85 4.50% 53.70% 1.00% 1.00% 30.5 125037 21 1.3 54.3 
Sri Lanka 32.5 50.6 11.80% 80.70% 1.30% 0.90% 28.2 1315 8.9 1.5 39.8 
Taiwan 78.9 91.5 3.00% 86.70%    114475 21.6 2.8 85.5 
Venezuela 30.1 44.7 78.10% 40.10% 2.20% 0.80% 25.1 2652 16.3 2.6 63.3 
Rank Correlations 
  IICCR EMCRR INFLATE TRDGDP POPGR AAGEGR AVEAGE MKTCAP P/E P/B P/D 
IICCR 1 0.97 -0.61 0.39 -0.58 0.54 0.53 0.66 0.36 -0.02 0.13 
EMCRR  1 -0.65 0.38 -0.54 0.44 0.48 0.71 0.45 0.06 0.21 
INFLATE   1 -0.31 0.24 -0.1 -0.27 -0.5 -0.28 0.02 0.06 
TRDGDP    1 0.02 0.18 -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 
POPGR     1 -0.47 -0.95 -0.09 -0.05 0.35 -0.07 
AAGEGR      1 0.39 0.36 0.26 -0.12 0.11 
AVEAGE       1 0.07 0.02 -0.36 -0.09 
MKTCAP        1 0.68 0.26 0.27 
P/E         1 0.16 0.37 
P/B          1 0.27 
P/D           1 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Agnor, Pierre, and Hoffmeister, (1995).  Money, Wages, and Inflation in Developing Countries.  I.M.F. 
Report.  
2. Belton, Catherine (10/2000).  Russia-all is Forgiven.  Business Week, October 9th. 2000. 
3. Dubash, Navriz Dr. (2000).  The Right Conditions, The World Bank Structural Adjustment Program.  World 
Bank Report, March 2000. 
4. J.P. Morgan (2000).  Emerging Benchmark Index. September 2000. 
5. O.E.C.D. Reports (1995).  The Use of Economic Instruments for Financial Management in Developing 
Countries. 
